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Abstract 
 
Simulation enables analysis of social systems that would be difficult or unethical 
to experiment upon directly.  Agent-based models have been used successfully in the 
field of generative social science to discover parsimonious sets of factors that generate 
social behavior.  This methodology provides an avenue to explore the spread of anti-
government sentiment in populations and to compare the effects of potential Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) actions. 
This research develops an agent-based model to investigate factors that affect the 
growth of rebel uprisings in a notional population.  It adds to the civil violence model 
developed by Epstein (2006) by enabling communication between agents in the manner 
of a genetic algorithm, and by adding the ability of agents to form friendships based on 
shared beliefs.  To identify and quantify the driving factors of rebellion and the spread of 
opinions, a designed experiment is performed examining the distribution of opinion and 
size of sub-populations of rebel and imprisoned civilians.  Additionally, two counter-
propaganda strategies are compared and explored.  Analysis identifies several factors that 
have effects that can explain some real-world observations, and provides a methodology 
for MISO operators to compare the effectiveness of potential actions. 
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FORECASTING EFFECTS OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS: A GENERATIVE 
SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY 
I. Introduction 
Background 
Ten years into what has become the US’s longest war, it seems clear that the 
Department of Defense (DoD) must invest more effort into understanding how a hearts 
and mind campaign can be won.  The most recent update of DoD Information Operations 
(IO) doctrine, JP 3-13 (2006, p. ix), defines the purpose of IO as “to influence, disrupt, 
corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our 
own.”  The five primary capabilities of IO are electronic warfare (EW), computer 
network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception 
(MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC).  Air Force IO doctrine, AFDD 2-5 (2005), 
breaks up IO differently: into electronic warfare operations (EWO), network warfare 
operations (NWO), and influence operations (IFO).  IFO is further split into PSYOP, 
MILDEC, OPSEC, counterintelligence (CI), counterpropaganda, and public affairs (PA).  
Each area of IO can be improved upon, but this thesis will take PSYOP as its focus area. 
The purpose of PSYOP is defined by the DoD in JP-13.2 (2010, p. vii) as “to 
influence foreign audience perceptions and subsequent behavior.”  In AFI 10-702 (2011, 
p. 2), the Air Force replaces the term PSYOP with the recently preferred term Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) and defines its purpose as “to induce, influence, 
or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of individuals, foreign 
leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US forces and 
objectives.”  This definition is important; no longer is the US focused only on decision 
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making.  Perceptions and attitudes are now recognized as critical to lasting behavioral 
change.   
The new focus on perceptions and attitudes introduces new difficulty to a force 
traditionally focused on tangible effects.  AFDD 2-5 (2005) discusses the challenges of 
effects-based planning and battle damage assessment (BDA) in the psychological 
domain.  MISO effects are likely lagged, confounded with nuisance factors, and may 
include unintended consequences.  Effects are therefore difficult to directly measure, and 
even more difficult to predict and plan for.  Moreover, experimentation of MISO 
campaign effects at home would be infeasible, unethical, or even illegal.   
AFDD 2-5 (2005, p. 28) recognizes that plans, then, “may also be based upon 
common sense, a rule of thumb, simplification, or an educated guess.”  Relying on the 
common sense of personnel experienced and trained in the application of MISO, 
supported by expert intelligence products as noted in AFI 10-702 (2011), is the state of 
the art, but there may be more objective ways to forecast and plan the effects of MISO. 
Simulation provides a potential alternative to experimentation.  Rather than 
testing MISO directly on humans, it may be possible to build a virtual test bed for these 
operations and observe the effects on software agents programmed to react in a 
psychologically and culturally appropriate manner to stimuli in their environments.  This 
thesis explores the application of agent-based modeling (ABM) to the problem area of 
MISO and the forecasting of its effects. 
 
3 
Problem Statement 
There is currently a dearth of simulations appropriate for forecasting the effects of 
MISO operations upon the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of a foreign 
populace.  To allow for realistic results, a simulation must have a firm foundation in 
psychological and sociological theory while being sufficiently parsimonious to be 
approachable to commanders who may not have a background in the social sciences.  
This thesis explores the use of ABM to generate sociologically valid behaviors from 
experimentally validated psychological theories, and uses this simulation as a test bed for 
MISO courses of action (COA). 
Scope 
The system being modeled here is not a specific real world environment or 
population, but a generic scenario of autonomous individuals interacting with each other.  
This represents a generalizable social landscape, which can be validated by comparing 
behaviors to established sociological phenomena.  It therefore represents a realistic point 
of departure, or a virtual control treatment, for testing of MISO COAs.  The intent is not 
to accurately model, in a single replication, how a specific human society or group will 
respond to a specific action.  To accomplish this would require a level of complexity that 
negates the communicability of the model, relegating it to a black box.  Instead, the intent 
is to find valid trends across replications that can inform assessment and comparison of 
the effectiveness of potential COAs. 
For this model, the level of modeling is the individual person.  As Epstein has 
pointed out, “individuals of any depth and interest are themselves societies” (2006, p. 
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346), but modeling every motivational drive as separate agents in an individual would be 
overly complicated for this application.  From a practical perspective, this allows the use 
of over a century of experimentally validated psychological theories as potential rules to 
generate other experimentally validated sociological theories as emergent phenomena in a 
complex system.  This also is a perspective well-suited to the bottom-up design of ABMs. 
Background 
Agents and ABM 
A model is simply an abstraction of reality.  Some common types of models 
include physical models, such as mockups of a construction project; conceptual models, 
such as an individual’s perception of reality; mathematical models, such as simple linear 
regression models; and simulation models, which are the focus of this paper.  Banks, 
Carson, Nelson, and Nicol (2010, p. 3) define simulation as “the imitation of a real-world 
process or system over time.”  Historically, there have been three distinct perspectives on 
simulation: macrosimulation, microsimulation, and ABM (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005).   
Macrosimulation is a top-down perspective using differential equations to define 
variables in a system as function of other variables of interest (Macy & Willer, 2002).  
An example of a macrosimulation method is systems dynamics.  Microsimulation builds 
a system bottom-up from the point-of-view of individuals, processes, and pieces of 
interest in a system.  An example of microsimulation is discrete-event simulation.  ABM 
grows out of microsimulation, maintaining the bottom-up perspective and adding the 
important ability for individual pieces, or agents, in the system to directly interact with 
one another.   
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There is much dispute about what truly constitutes an agent.  Macy and Willer 
(2002) propose four requirements for agents; they must be autonomous, interdependent, 
follow simple rules, and be adaptive and backward-looking.  North and Macal (2007) 
require that agents be adaptive, able to learn and alter behaviors, autonomous, and 
heterogeneous.  Epstein (2006) lists common, but not required, features of agents as 
heterogeneity, autonomy, limited spatial range of communication, and bounded 
rationality.  For the purposes of this thesis, an agent is defined as an autonomous entity in 
a simulation defined by rules of movement and behavior that react to their surroundings 
and/or neighboring agents.  This definition is chosen over more stringent definitions 
because they would discount important ABMs that do not have adaptive, heterogeneous 
agents, such as Schelling’s classic model of housing segregation (1971). 
What is an ABM? 
An agent-based model is defined by agents, relationships between agents, and the 
environment upon which they move and act (Macal & North, 2010).  In modern 
simulations this space often takes the form of a toroid, a rectangle wrapping at both 
horizontal and vertical edges, but other spaces can be defined as best fits the system being 
modeled.  Relationships, or links, formalize lasting relationships between agents and the 
effects thereof, and can be a source for additional analysis, such as social network 
analysis. 
Bonabeau (2002) lists the advantages of ABM as the abilities to capture emergent 
phenomena, naturally describe a system, and do so flexibly.  Emergent phenomena are 
“stable macroscopic patterns arising from the local interaction of agents” (Epstein & 
Why use ABMs? 
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Axtell, 1996, p. 35).  These are the result of ABMs typically describing complex adaptive 
systems (Holland, 1995).   
The ability to naturally describe a system is vital for operations researchers.  In 
operations research, models are typically built and simulations run by analysts to support 
a decision maker (DM).  These DMs may or may not have a background in the technical 
bases of the model.  For a DM to truly trust the results of a model, it must not be a black 
box; instead, the DM should be able to understand at least the basic workings of the 
model.  It is therefore advantageous when an analyst can describe the model naturally by 
describing agents as people, stating what each agent perceives and why they act as they 
do. 
The flexibility of ABM enables the intended use of this model: to act as a virtual 
experiment for MISO COAs.  Once a model gives valid outputs, modifications are 
relatively simple to make.  This allows an analyst to add stimuli such as leaflets or 
propaganda posters, change the psychological or cultural parameters for a new target 
audience (TA), or introduce new types of agents such as ambassadors or MISO operators. 
History of ABM 
The birth of ABM is regularly credited to Conway’s Game of Life in 1970, which 
is pointed to as an example of ABM performed without the benefit of computers.  
Conway did actually use a PDP-7 computer to discover many aspects of the game 
(Gardner, 1970).  This illustrates the importance of technology for ABM.  ABM is a 
young simulation perspective that is continually growing more robust with the increased 
availability and power of computers.  
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ABM of sociological phenomena is nearly as old as ABM itself.  Schelling (1971) 
built an ABM predicting racial segregation in housing based upon simple rules of moving 
when half of neighbors on a 1-dimensional space were of the other race.  He found that 
there was a tipping point at approximately 20% minority population in a neighborhood at 
which the neighborhood’s minority population would grow to 100%.  The results have 
been disputed, but the methodology was intriguing. 
The next 10-15 years saw very little development, but as computers became 
commonplace in the late 1980s, ABM began to re-emerge.  Reynolds’s (1987) ABM of 
boids depicting realistic bird flocking behavior seems to have ignited a renewed interest.  
The boids acted on three simple rules; collision avoidance, velocity matching, and flock 
centering.  Even so, they exhibited the complex behavior of flocks that could not be 
explained from a macrosimulation perspective.   
Another influential ABM development is that of the genetic algorithm (GA), as 
exemplified by Holland’s model Echo (1995).  Echo captures the behavior of complex 
adaptive systems by using a digital analogue to genetics.  As agents replicate, “child” 
agents are given a mix of the two “parent” agents’ characteristic string of 0s and 1s, with 
some rare random mutations possible.  This has been used successfully to find optimal 
and likely solutions (Macy & Willer, 2002) and has been proposed for use in 
evolutionary psychology (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003).  The general nature of the GA, 
like the larger field of ABM, holds the potential to be used in virtually any field. 
The usefulness of ABM has been recognized perhaps more often than 
implemented in the social sciences.  The literature contains calls for application of ABM 
with a robust backing in social science theory in social services (Israel & Wolf-Branigin, 
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2011), evacuation models (Till, 2010), and social scientists working in areas where 
rigorous experimentation is limited by ethical considerations (Ball, 2007). 
Generative Social Science 
Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape model demonstrated a new paradigm for 
the study of the social sciences using ABM, which they call generative social science 
(GSS).  In Sugarscape, agents act according to very simple rules dominated by the drive 
to acquire a resource, sugar, that exists in various amounts in different areas of the 
environment, and without which the agent will die.  Emergent behaviors of Sugarscape 
include the emergence of differing cultures near geographically separated resource pools, 
inequitable distributions of wealth, and a survival of the fittest that is stifled by familial 
inheritance of resources. 
Sugarscape demonstrates the key features of GSS.  In a manifesto on generative 
social science, Epstein  proposes a motto for GSS: “If you didn’t grow it, you didn’t 
explain its emergence” (2006, p. 8).  Another key desideratum of GSS is the use of the 
simplest possible rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest.  The canonical agent-
based experiment would be to “situate an initial population of autonomous heterogeneous 
agents in a relevant spatial environment; allow them to interact according to simple local 
rules, and thereby generate – or ‘grow’ – the macroscopic regularity from the bottom up” 
(Epstein, 2006, p. 7). 
GSS has gained significant popularity as a methodology, and examples of its 
application can be found in many of the social sciences.  In economics, GSS has been 
used to demonstrate that diversity of suppliers leads to market stability (Zhang, Li, 
Xiong, & Zhang, 2010), and to generate consumer decision making processes based on 
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culture and psychology (Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani, 
& Verwaart, 2011).  In archaeology, Epstein (2006) demonstrated a realistic portrayal of 
the history, and sudden disappearance of, the Anasazi culture of the southwest U.S.  In 
sociology, Mäs, Flache, and Helbing (2010) grew a cultural diversity in a population that 
is robust to noise.  Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, and Gruenewald (2006) developed a model of 
drinking behavior and examined the positive and negative effects of the presence of bars 
at which drinkers can congregate.  Epstein (2006) grew the emergence of social class 
hierarchy, as well as eruptions of civil violence in the face of occupying forces.  In 
psychology, Epstein (2006) generated the behavior of thoughtlessly applying norms of 
behavior, which was subsequently supported in laboratory experiments by Willer, Macy, 
and Kuwabara (2009).  This demonstrates a powerful possibility for GSS to provide 
theories of behavior that can be confirmed or rejected by traditional experimentation. 
Social Science Primer 
A basic foundation in the social sciences, and particularly social psychology, 
should inform the development of a GSS growing sociological behaviors.  While 
encompassing all relevant social science is beyond the scope of this thesis, if not 
impossible, two specific areas emerge as particularly relevant: influence psychology and 
culture. 
Influence Psychology 
Influence psychology is a broad field of social psychology.  Hogg (2009) points 
out that, by one popular definition, social psychology is the study of influence.  For the 
purposes of ABM, the most relevant thrust of influence psychology research seems to be 
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that of interpersonal persuasion.  These concepts can be coded in a simplified manner as 
agent rules of interaction.  Cialdini (2007) identifies six major concepts that define 
interpersonal persuasion: reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, 
liking, authority, and scarcity.   
Reciprocation is defined by the drive to repay any perceived gift or favor given by 
another person or group (Cialdini, 2007).  This is the concept exploited by grocery stores 
offering free samples of a product directly next to a display full of that product with the 
expectation of higher sales.  Furthermore, the effect of reciprocation can be compounded 
by the foot-in-the-door effect, whereby people are inclined to give again once they have 
given once, often in larger quantities or more substantial ways (Hogg, 2009). 
Commitment and consistency act in concert, pushing people to commit to a 
decision made or action taken and act consistently with that decision (Cialdini, 2007).  
The state of information under which the original decision is made is irrelevant; one 
remains likely to stand by early decisions in the face of evidence.  One possible 
explanation for this comes from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957).  This 
predicts that a basic motivation in action and belief is a negative feeling experienced by 
an individual whenever his or her actions and beliefs do not align with each other.  
People will therefore, depending on circumstance, change action, belief, or both to 
minimize the feeling of cognitive dissonance.  Because past actions are impossible to 
change, beliefs are more likely to change to fit those actions, and future actions will 
mirror those new beliefs. 
Social proof refers to the behavior colloquially known as monkey see, monkey do.  
This is the tendency to see behavior as more appropriate or acceptable when others are 
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observed to be performing it (Cialdini, 2007).  Bandura (1977) identified this effect with 
his social learning theory, which states that imitation of others’ behavior is a genetically 
predisposed behavior.  He also proposed that social approval is among the strongest 
social reinforcers for people of all ages.  Indeed, laboratory experiments show that people 
will enforce norms of behavior, even those that they disagree with, in order to fit in 
(Willer, Macy, & Kuwabara, 2009).  This again can act in concert with cognitive 
dissonance to be a very powerful factor in interpersonal persuasion. 
Liking is a complex concept worthy of its own field of psychology.  With regards 
to social influence, it is useful to recognize that people are more influenced by people 
they like than by people they do not like (Cialdini, 2007).  Factors that influence how 
much a person likes another include their subjective physical attractiveness, their 
similarity to one another, ingratiating actions such as compliments directed toward him or 
her, their familiarity with one another, and their mental associations of the other person 
with other liked things.   
Authority is an often-underestimated desire to act in accordance with the demands 
or desires of authority figures (Cialdini, 2007).  This was made famous, or perhaps 
infamous, by Milgram in his classic experiments showing that most participants would 
shock a screaming, pleading, and even unconscious confederate participant at the 
instruction of a person in a lab coat (1974).  Hogg (2009) points out, however, that mere 
compliance is a surface behavioral change that does not have lasting effects on action.  
Also, it appears that in cases of compliance the behavior is justified by the presence of an 
authority figure, and thus it activates much lower levels of cognitive dissonance thereby 
muting attitudinal shift. 
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The final concept identified by Cialdini (2007) is scarcity, which predicts that 
something that is rare is perceived as being more valuable than something that is more 
abundant.  In a model where agents gather resources, this could result in agents with 
greater stores of resources having less motivation to continue gathering and therefore 
more freedom to explore other opportunities. 
The previous factors do not explicitly take individual differences into 
consideration, but naturally the audience of any message is as important as the source and 
content of the message.  Myers (2008) identifies two important audience characteristics 
that lend themselves to being modeled: self-esteem and age.   
Audience Factors 
Self-esteem has a non-linear effect on ease of influence; low and high self-esteem 
individuals are more difficult to influence than those with moderate self-esteem (Rhodes 
& Wood, 1992).  High self-esteem yields confidence in one’s opinion, while low self-
esteem yields low confidence in one’s correct comprehension of the message. 
The effect of an audience’s age has been tested against two hypotheses: that 
attitudes become more conservative as age increases, and that attitudes simply become 
more resistant to change as age increases (Myers, 2008).  Experiments support the latter 
hypothesis; older people simply refuse to change their opinions while younger people’s 
opinions remain more malleable.  The observation of conservativism in old age merely 
reflects the liberalization of the popular opinion over time. 
Culture 
While each individual acts according to their beliefs, attitudes, and personalities, 
culture informs these values and may serve as a baseline in lieu of information on 
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individuals.  There are two commonly used frameworks for cultural attributes.  
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions originally consisted of Power Distance, Individualism, 
Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity (1980).  Added to the core four are Long Term 
Orientation (Franke, Hofstede, & Bond, 1991) and most recently Indulgence (Hofstede, 
Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).  Hofstede’s dimensions are focused on the roots of business 
behavior, being intended to inform managers of multicultural teams. 
The second common framework comes from the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research Project (GLOBE) (House, Hanges, 
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).  The GLOBE project surveyed 62 societies on a 
framework expanded from Hofstede.  It is also primarily business focused, but its factors 
are both more specific and broader in scope.  The nine GLOBE dimensions are 
Uncertainty Avoidance, Power Distance, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group 
Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, Future Orientation, Performance 
Orientation, and Humane Orientation. 
Uncertainty Avoidance is the propensity for individuals to avoid uncertainty by 
codifying norms of behavior (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).  Power 
Distance is the level of individuals’ expectations of power stratification and 
concentration.  Institutional Collectivism is a measure of institutional encouragement of 
collective distribution of resources and collective action.  In-Group Collectivism is a 
measure of the strength of identity with organizations, tribes, or families.  Gender 
Egalitarianism is a measure of society’s promotion of gender equality over strict gender 
roles.  Assertiveness measures individuals’ willingness to engage in conflict in social 
relationships.  These first six dimensions align with Hofstede’s original four dimensions, 
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with Individualism split into the two Collectivism dimensions and Masculinity split into 
Gender Egalitarianism and Assertiveness. 
Future Orientation is a measure of the willingness of individuals to delay 
gratification in favor of long-term planning; this corresponds with Hofstede’s Long-Term 
Orientation (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).  Performance 
Orientation is the cultural focus upon, and willingness to reward individuals for, 
performance.  Humane Orientation measures the value placed upon fairness, altruism, 
and kindness between individuals.  Performance and Humane Orientation are important 
factors that are not directly addressed by Hofstede’s framework. 
The empirically measured values of the nine GLOBE dimensions can serve as 
parameters to affect the application of the rules derived from influence psychology.  This 
offers a practical methodology for accounting for differences in culture and target 
audience for MISO COAs. 
Application to MISO 
The joint MISO process, shown in Figure 1, indicates the current cycle of MISO 
execution.  This process begins with planning the desired effect, and then examines the 
target audience (TA) before beginning to generate a plan.  Within this framework, there is 
an opportunity to take the results of target audience analysis (TAA) and feed it into a 
simulation that allows for comparison of potential COAs and their ability to generate the 
desired effect without having deleterious secondary and tertiary effects.  This simulation 
cannot and should not replace a skilled analyst with familiarity with the TA, but it can be 
a tool provided that it is usable and transparent to the analyst. 
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Figure 1.  Joint MISO Process (Department of Defense, 2010) 
 
There are models that have been developed to fill this need, but they fall into two 
categories that keep them from being used.  First, there is the model that is too specific to 
be generalizable to other target audiences and too complicated to have transparency to an 
analyst or decision maker (DM).  An example of this, and the problems associated with 
communicating the underlying mechanics of the model to a DM, is the Socio-Cultural 
Analysis Tool (S-CAT) (Murray, et al., 2011).  The other case is the one that over-
focuses on accuracy of forecasts and loses the ability to effectively perform what-if 
analysis.  An example of this is the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS), a 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) funded program (O'Brien, 
2010).  ICEWS began with a hybrid statistical, system-dynamics, and agent-based 
modeling approach, but it gradually shifted during development to be dominated by 
statistical models to focus on forecasting performance at the cost of what-if capabilities.  
Models falling into either category are doomed to be of limited or no use to a MISO 
planner. 
Improvements in MISO can have significant implications for national security.  
Successful implementation of MISO can prevent conflicts from requiring an armed 
presence or diminish the cost and duration of a military intervention.  Not only is this 
desirable from a humanist perspective, as it limits human suffering and promotes peace, it 
is also desirable from a fiscal perspective as the DoD begins to face budgets more limited 
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than seen in recent years.  Clearly a more peaceful, cost-effective solution is desirable for 
the DoD and the international community. 
Methodology 
Our model represents a significant departure from Epstein’s (2006) civil violence 
model.  This research focuses on implementation of social psychology principles into 
rules of interaction and communication while maintaining Epstein’s observed 
characteristics to maintain validity.  It remains important, however, to adhere to the tenets 
of generative social science (GSS) and keep the applied rules as parsimonious as possible 
to generate realistic behavior, so this remains a focus. 
As with Esptein’s model, the scenario is a population under the influence of some 
government that may be perceived to be more or less legitimate or effective.  
Furthermore, the scope of this research is a generalized population interacting with one 
another without consideration of specific individuals that could be modeled, such as 
prominent leaders.  One of the strengths of ABM is that such additional agent types can 
be added in future research to increase the realism of the model.   
COAs under consideration may take the form of a change in the environment, or 
they may take the form of additional agent types that are more directly controlled than the 
general population.  For example, a propaganda poster would take the form of an 
immobile agent that provides only one-directional communication about a very specific 
topic.  It remains beyond the scope of this research to predict the perception of a specific 
message; instead, the specifics of modeling a given COA are left to the expert MISO 
analyst. 
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Model Construction 
This model is developed from the agent level using the agent-based modeling 
environment Repast Simphony Beta 2.0, developed at Argonne National Laboratory 
(North, Howe, Collier, & Vos, 2007).  This environment was selected based upon its 
open-source nature and the base infrastructure being amenable to social systems.  Other 
environments were considered but discounted based upon their focus on process flow 
systems. 
Two major changes on Epstein’s (2006) model are effected.  First, agents are 
given the ability to communicate and alter their grievance.  In order to maintain 
heterogeneity in opinions, grievance is modeled as a gene as described by Holland (1995) 
rather than as a single scalar.  Second, agents during this communication make 
friendships with like-minded others, which in turn alter patterns of movement. 
The full code is presented in the appendices in six classes.  Appendix A presents 
the Globals and Panel Factory class, which codes the global variables and user interface 
for the visualization.  Appendix B presents the Observer class, where all methods called 
by buttons on the user interface reside.  Appendices C-F present the agent classes: 
Civilians, Cops, MISO agents, and Relationship links. 
Chapter 2 presents a detailed look at the development of this ABM and analytical 
results.  Chapter 3 provides a proof of concept case study, outlining how an ABM such as 
this one may be used by a MISO analyst in planning a campaign.  Chapter 4 concludes 
with significant findings and discussion of potential areas for future research.  Note that 
Chapters 2 and 3 are structured as standalone papers, and there will be some overlap 
between these chapters and Chapter 1. 
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II. Analysis of Factors Influencing Civil Violence: An ABM Approach 
Introduction 
In the last decade, the United States has found herself fighting wars on a 
battlespace she has little expertise with: the hearts and minds of populations whose 
support can make or break a campaign. This sort of campaign relies heavily upon 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), operations whose purpose is “to 
induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of 
individuals, foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US 
forces and objectives” (Department of the Air Force, 2011, p. 2). MISO is a difficult task. 
The effects are nearly impossible to measure due to confounding nuisance factors outside 
of the operators’ control, and experimentation is not ethically viable.  Therefore, 
forecasting of effects has traditionally relied upon subject matter experts armed with 
sophisticated intelligence products (Department of the Air Force, 2005). 
Simulation provides an alternative method for measuring and forecasting MISO 
effects. Social systems tend to take the form of complex adaptive systems, which in turn 
are best modeled by agent-based models (ABM).  ABM of sociological phenomena is not 
new; one of the first ABMs examined racial segregation in housing (Schelling, 1971).  
Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) Sugarscape marked the beginning of a research paradigm 
known as Generative Social Science (GSS).  The key desideratum of GSS is the use of 
the simplest possible rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest (Epstein, 2006).   
GSS has gained significant popularity as a methodology, and examples of its 
application can be found in many of the social sciences.  In economics, GSS has been 
used to demonstrate that diversity of suppliers leads to market stability (Zhang, Li, 
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Xiong, & Zhang, 2010), and to generate consumer decision making processes based on 
culture and psychology (Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani, 
& Verwaart, 2011).  In archaeology, Epstein (2006) demonstrated a realistic portrayal of 
the history, and sudden disappearance of, the Anasazi culture of the southwest U.S.  In 
sociology, Mäs, Flache, and Helbing (2010) grew a cultural diversity in a population that 
is robust to noise.  Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, and Gruenewald (2006) developed a model of 
drinking behavior and examined the positive and negative effects of the presence of bars 
at which drinkers can congregate.  Epstein (2006) grew the emergence of social class 
hierarchy, as well as eruptions of civil violence in the face of occupying forces.  In 
psychology, Epstein (2006) generated the behavior of thoughtless application of norms of 
behavior, which was subsequently supported in laboratory experiments by Willer, Macy, 
and Kuwabara (2009).  In this way, GSS and traditional experimental social psychology 
can and should work hand-in-hand to advance the field. 
Epstein’s (2006) civil violence model serves as the basis for the present work.  
This model populated a 40 x 40 grid with Agents and Cops.  Because the term Agents 
implies that the Cops are not agents, we use the term Civilians.  On this grid, Cops and 
Civilians each move at random.  On the basis of their perceived grievance against the 
government, legitimacy of the government, individual risk tolerance, and the presence of 
other actively rebellious Civilians and Cops in their local region, these Civilians at each 
step decide if they will become actively rebellious.  If they do, they become potential 
targets for Cops to arrest and remove from the simulation for some period of time.  Our 
model expands on this to add communication between civilians and movement that is 
 
20 
more grounded in influence psychology, specifically the concept of liking as presented by 
Cialdini (2007).   
In the remainder of this paper we present a more specific description of the 
theoretical scenario, the simulation, and a designed experiment examining the impact of 
some factors of interest on the behavior and opinions of individuals in a social landscape.  
We discuss this approach, the results, and provide some conclusions and potential 
avenues for advancing this research. 
Scenario and Simulation Development 
As in Epstein’s model, the scenario is a generic population of autonomous 
individuals under the influence of some government with a specified degree of 
legitimacy.  Civilians move about the landscape and interact with one another, forming 
friendships and sharing opinions on specific topics that aggregate to form grievance 
against the government.  They also may choose to become actively rebellious, depending 
on their grievance and the perceived risk of being arrested.  If they are actively rebellious, 
they run the risk of being arrested by Cops.  Cops move randomly about the landscape 
arresting rebels as they find them. 
This represents a generalizable social landscape, which can be validated by 
comparing emergent behaviors to established sociological phenomena.  The intent here is 
not to accurately model any specific population or scenario; this has been attempted in 
other models such as the Socio-Cultural Analysis Tool (S-CAT) (Murray, et al., 2011).  
The result is an over-complicated system not generally trusted by decision-makers and 
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therefore not used.  Instead this model aims to find a parsimonious set of factors leading 
to realistic behaviors of interest, in the spirit of GSS. 
Software and Programming Considerations 
The simulation itself is built within Repast Simphony 2.0 Beta (North, Howe, 
Collier, & Vos, 2007).  The underlying virtual space about which agents move is a 40 x 
40 torus.  The agents move in random order each tick of simulated time.  Each patch has 
a holding capacity of only one un-jailed Civilian or Cop.  This prevents clustering of all 
agents in very small geographical spaces and allows for much more effective 
visualization, but it adds to the computational complexity significantly.  To ameliorate 
this issue, the software maintains a linked list of all empty patches that is polled when an 
agent moves rather than polling all available patches and querying the number of agents 
thereon.  This significantly decreases processing time. 
Similarly, the software maintains lists of all imprisoned Civilians, active rebels, 
and peaceful Civilians.  The simpler alternative is to always consider every civilian in 
range and query their status.  At the stage of development where this change was made, 
run speed increased from 42 to 73 ticks per minute at population density of 0.70.  At 
population density 0.50, the change was from 58 to 76 ticks per minute, demonstrating 
that the change diminished the difference in processing time induced by increasing the 
number of agents.  With any ABM, streamlining processing tasks is imperative. 
Cop Logic 
Cops are relatively simple agents performing two tasks directly: arresting active 
rebels and moving about the landscape.  Each Cop has identical vision and movement 
range, designated copVision, which is set by the user.  The logic is shown in Figure 2.  
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The cop first searches the range of copVision for active rebels.  If it finds any, it picks one 
at random and arrests them.  An arrest consists of setting the target Civilian’s status to 
jailed, hiding them in the visualization, adding their occupied patch to the list of empty 
patches, and pulling a jail term from a uniform distribution between 0 and the user-
specified maximum jail term.  For all simulations in this study, the maximum jail term is 
30 ticks.  If an arrest is made, the Cop moves to the location of the arrested Civilian; 
otherwise, it moves to a randomly selected open patch within its range.  If no patch is 
open, it simply does not move. 
 
Figure 2.  Cop Logic Flow 
 
Cops also serve as a source of information for Civilians, though they do not play 
this role directly.  Their presence in an area impacts the behavior of the Civilians that are 
aware of the Cop’s presence.  This role will be seen more in depth in the Civilian logic. 
Civilian Logic 
Civilians are far more complicated in their logic than Cops.  The full logic is 
shown in Figure 3.  A Civilian is aware of its surrounding to a user-specified range, 
designated civVision, and is capable of moving up to another user-specified range, 
designated civRange.  At the highest level, each turn that they are not jailed, a Civilian 
moves about the landscape, makes a decision about whether to be actively rebellious, 
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then communicates with another Civilian.  If a Civilian is jailed, it simply checks if its 
jail term is complete.  If so, it moves to a random open patch and makes a decision about 
its rebel status, and becomes visible.   
 
Figure 3.  Civilian logic flow 
  
If the Civilian is not jailed and one or more Civilians within civVision is a friend, 
one of those friends is chosen at random.  The Civilian will then move to a random patch 
within civRange that is closest to that friend.  If there are no friends within civVision, the 
Civilian moves to a random open patch within civRange, or stays still if there is no open 
patch available. 
Next, the Civilian decides if it should be actively rebellious.  This logic is 
equivalent to that in Epstein (2006).  The Civilian counts both the number of Cops (C) 
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and the number of active rebels (A) within civVision and computes an estimated 
probability of arrest (P),  
 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑒−2.3�
𝐶
𝐴�𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (1) 
It then calculates net risk (N) by multiplying this probability by its risk tolerance (R), a 
value between 0 and 1 which is held constant for each Civilian and drawn from a uniform 
distribution, 
 𝑁 = 𝑅𝑃 (2) 
If grievance is greater than net risk by at least a threshold value, designated 
rebelThreshold and set to 0.1 in all simulations in this study, the Civilian will become an 
active rebel.  Otherwise, it will be inactive.  In this way, the presence of Cops serves to 
force rebellious Civilians into hiding, while the presence of other rebellious Civilians 
serves to diminish this effect. 
The value of grievance represents the sum of anti-government sentiment held by a 
Civilian.  In Epstein (2006), each Civilian drew a hardship value of 0 to 1 from a uniform 
distribution and multiplied this by  (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)  to obtain grievance.  To initialize, 
this simulation draws a hardship value between 0 and 20 from a uniform integer 
distribution and multiplies this by  1−legitimacy
20
  to obtain grievance.  Hardship is 
thereafter characterized using a genetic algorithm (GA) as described by Holland (1995).  
This opinionGene is an array of 20 integers, each of which can take a value of 0 or 1.  
Each index on the gene represents a single specific opinion.  These opinions amalgamate 
to form a concept of anti-government sentiment, which is scaled by  (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)  
to maintain cohesion to Epstein’s model. Thus,  
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𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = �
1
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𝑖=1
� (1 − 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦) (3) 
These opinions can be modified by communication or by mutation, which occurs 
with probability 0.01 at a random index during communication.  This mutation is 
necessary to avoid rendering an opinion extinct.  The GA is used both because it is more 
psychologically accurate than a single number, and because it prevents the simulation 
from trending toward uniform grievance of 0.   
 The final part of a Civilian’s logic is communication.  If there are other Civilians 
in its Moore neighborhood, the eight patches bordering the agent, one of them is selected 
at random as a target with whom to communicate.  First, a topic of conversation is 
chosen, represented by an index on the opinionGene.  The target’s value on the 
opinionGene is replaced by the source’s value.  Next, the opinionGenes are compared.  If 
the proportion of the opinion gene where the two disagree is less than a threshold, 
designated friendThreshold and held at 0.25 for this study, a non-directional friendship 
link is generated between the two Civilians.  This link will remain for the next 20 turns in 
the absence of future communication. 
Visualization 
Analysis of ABMs often requires qualitative observation of trends in addition to 
quantitative analysis, so appropriate visualization is vital.  The visualization in this 
simulation provides information of both the observable external state and the hidden 
internal state.  An example for reference is shown in Figure 4.  The external state is 
shown in the foreground.  Civilians are represented by human stick figures colored red if 
they are active rebels and blue otherwise, jailed Civilians are not shown, and Cops are 
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represented by gold stars.  The internal state of Civilians is shown in the background and 
connecting arrows.  Each line represents a friendship between two Civilians.  The 
background color is scaled from black, for low grievance of the occupying Civilian, to 
red, for high grievance. 
The screenshot in Figure 4 shows both qualitative findings from Epstein (2006) 
remaining present in this simulation.  First, there are quite a few Civilians with very high 
levels of grievance acting deceptively in areas being patrolled by Cops, taking the role of 
inactive Civilians.  Second, a local breakout in rebellion is occurring where random 
motion has left Civilians unaware of any Cops in the area.  This kind of breakout is 
temporally punctuated, with rebellion occurring in spikes at random intervals.  
 
 
Figure 4.  Screenshot of Simulation Portraying Civilians (People) Colored According to Whether 
They Are Active Rebels (Red) or Not (Blue) Exhibiting Grievance (Background Scaled Black to Red), 
Friendships (Lines), and Cops (Gold Stars) 
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Experimental Design 
Factors of Interest 
The primary purpose of this experiment is to identify the relevant structural 
variables that may affect the dynamics of rebellion in the simulation.  Structural variables 
expected to possibly have an effect are civilian range of vision (civVision), civilian range 
of movement (civRange), cop range of vision (copVision), initial population density 
(popDensity), and Cop density (copDensity).  Population density is the proportion of 
possible patches populated by Cops and/or Civilians at initialization, and Cop density is 
the proportional size of the subpopulation that are Cops.  These variables in the actual 
system of a social landscape may be affected indirectly by geography or technology in 
the case of range, and may simply vary by region in the case of densities. 
A secondary purpose of this experiment is to determine whether the addition of 
preference in movement toward friends has a discernible effect.  The intent is to increase 
psychological realism by creating social clusters, but any observed non-qualitative effects 
would be useful to note. 
The factors and their levels are summarized in Table 1.  Other values such as 
threshold values remain fixed because those values were fixed in Epstein (2006).  The 
intent is to remain aligned with the qualitative observations from Epstein’s model, which 
are exhibited in the present model using the same values. 
  
 
28 
Table 1.  Factors and Levels Used in Experiment 
 
Factor Low Value Mid Value High Value 
A Civilian Range of Vision 1 4 7 
B Civilian Range of Movement 1 4 7 
C Cop Range of Vision 1 4 7 
D Movement Toward Friends No N/A Yes 
E Population Density 0.3 0.5 0.7 
F Cop Density 0.01 0.04 0.07 
 
Response Variables 
Four response variables allow for future comparison after implementing MISO 
actions in the simulation.  Each simulation run lasts for 300 ticks, and all observations are 
made after every agent has acted in random order for a given tick. 
The first two response variables, mean grievance and grievance variance, relate 
to the distribution of grievance at the end of the simulation.  For ease of interpretation, 
grievance is recorded here as the sum of each element of the opinion gene, before 
correcting for legitimacy.  While at initialization grievance is distributed uniformly, it is 
to be expected that as each element of the opinion gene becomes its own random 
variable, grievance should tend toward a normal distribution.  From prior investigation, 
this is observed, so only the mean and variance of the grievance distribution are gathered.  
The mean should not be affected by any factor, because there is no preference toward 
either 0s or 1s with the exception of arrests occurring more often to civilians with high 
grievance. 
The remaining responses relate to the amount of rebellion observed under a set of 
conditions.  Rebel activity occurs in bursts under both realistic and simulated conditions, 
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so a point observation is not appropriate (Epstein, 2006).  Rather, the mean proportion of 
Civilians in a given state over a period of time is appropriate.  The first 100 steps are 
omitted to allow for initialization of the simulation.  Therefore, mean prisoner ratio is the 
mean proportion of Civilians in prison over time steps 101-300, and mean rebel ratio is 
the mean proportion of Civilians that are active rebels over time steps 101-300.   
Design Type 
This experiment is a full factorial 26 design with 2 replications and 4 center points 
for each value of factor D, the inclusion of friendship rules, for a total of 136 replications.  
Fractional factorials would have allowed fewer data points, but complex adaptive systems 
are defined by nonlinearity and the assumption that high-order effects would be non-
significant is not likely to be met.   
Results 
Grievance Distribution 
As expected, no factors or interactions have a significant effect upon mean 
grievance.  The observed mean grievance is 9.91, with variance 0.1813.  Some factors 
and interactions affect variance as discussed below. 
A natural logarithm transformation sufficed to normalize residuals in analysis of 
the grievance variance.  The resulting ANOVA is shown in Table 2.  Three factors, and 
every possible interaction between them, affect the variance: Civilian vision range (A), 
Cop vision range (C), and Cop Density (F).  These are each significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001, 
and jointly they are significant with 𝑝 < 0.05.  Pure quadratic curvature is also 
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statistically significant with 𝑝 = 0.0013, but it is not practically significant with a sum of 
squares less than 5% that of the next smallest effect.   
Table 2.  ANOVA for ln(grievance variance) 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Value p-value 
Model 13.18662 7 1.883803 478.54 < 0.0001 
A 1.469471 1 1.469471 373.29 < 0.0001 
C 3.508438 1 3.508438 891.25 < 0.0001 
F 2.632555 1 2.632555 668.75 < 0.0001 
AC 1.474048 1 1.474048 374.45 < 0.0001 
AF 1.445637 1 1.445637 367.23 < 0.0001 
CF 1.443684 1 1.443684 366.74 < 0.0001 
ACF 1.212792 1 1.212792 308.08 < 0.0001 
Curvature 0.04288 1 0.04288 10.89 0.0013 
Residual 0.499942 127 0.003937 
  Lack of Fit 0.21387 57 0.003752 0.92 0.6286 
Pure Error 0.286073 70 0.004087 
  Total 13.72945 135 
    
Mean Prisoner Ratio 
A power transformation with 𝜆 = 0.3 resulted in normalization of residuals for 
mean prisoner ratio.  ANOVA results are shown in Table 3.  Five factors and nine 
interactions achieve joint significance 𝑝 < 0.05, and two interactions are included in 
analysis for hierarchy.  Significant effects are Civilian vision range (A), Civilian 
movement range (B), Cop vision range (C), population density (E), Cop density (F), AC, 
AE, AF, CE, CF, ACF, AEF, CEF, and ACEF.  Note that the factors having greatest 
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effects are again A, C, F, and every interaction between them.  Pure quadratic curvature 
is also significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001, but it does not dominate. 
Table 3.  ANOVA for (mean prisoner ratio)
Source 
0.3 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Value p-value 
Model 5.042679 16 0.315167 892.07 < 0.0001 
A 1.426079 1 1.426079 4036.47 < 0.0001 
B 0.005433 1 0.005433 15.38 0.0001 
C 2.823678 1 2.823678 7992.32 < 0.0001 
E 0.006652 1 0.006652 18.83 < 0.0001 
F 0.301663 1 0.301663 853.85 < 0.0001 
AC 0.048534 1 0.048534 137.37 < 0.0001 
AE 0.010434 1 0.010434 29.53 < 0.0001 
AF 0.301018 1 0.301018 852.02 < 0.0001 
CE 0.008973 1 0.008973 25.40 < 0.0001 
CF 0.017255 1 0.017255 48.84 < 0.0001 
EF 0.000118 1 0.000118 0.33 0.5650 
ACE 0.000327 1 0.000327 0.93 0.3380 
ACF 0.073941 1 0.073941 209.29 < 0.0001 
AEF 0.006949 1 0.006949 19.67 < 0.0001 
CEF 0.003076 1 0.003076 8.71 0.0038 
ACEF 0.008549 1 0.008549 24.20 < 0.0001 
Curvature 0.049834 1 0.049834 141.05 < 0.0001 
Residual 0.041689 118 0.000353 
  
Lack of Fit 0.018711 48 0.00039 1.19 0.2529 
Pure Error 0.022978 70 0.000328 
  
Total 5.134203 135 
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Mean Rebel Ratio 
A natural logarithm transformation achieved normalized residuals with mean 
rebel ratio.  ANOVA results are shown in Table 4.  Civilian vision range (A), Cop vision 
range (C), population density (E), and cop density (F), and interactions AC, AE, AF, CE, 
CF, EF, ACF, AEF, and CEF have effects individually significant with 𝑝 < 0.0001 and 
jointly significant with 𝑝 < 0.05.  Pure quadratic curvature is small but statistically 
significant with  𝑝 < 0.0001. 
Table 4.  ANOVA for ln(mean rebel ratio) 
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Value p-value 
Model 449.6666 13 34.58974 588.56 < 0.0001 
A 83.15574 1 83.15574 1414.94 < 0.0001 
C 53.91509 1 53.91509 917.39 < 0.0001 
E 20.22047 1 20.22047 344.06 < 0.0001 
F 201.6595 1 201.6595 3431.35 < 0.0001 
AC 7.098212 1 7.098212 120.78 < 0.0001 
AE 10.26187 1 10.26187 174.61 < 0.0001 
AF 28.39973 1 28.39973 483.24 < 0.0001 
CE 1.112586 1 1.112586 18.93 < 0.0001 
CF 27.58989 1 27.58989 469.46 < 0.0001 
EF 7.816607 1 7.816607 133.00 < 0.0001 
ACF 4.416607 1 4.416607 75.15 < 0.0001 
AEF 2.138198 1 2.138198 36.38 < 0.0001 
CEF 1.882091 1 1.882091 32.02 < 0.0001 
Curvature 1.110018 1 1.110018 18.89 < 0.0001 
Residual 7.111144 121 0.05877 
  
Lack of Fit 3.217693 51 0.063092 1.13 0.3095 
Pure Error 3.893452 70 0.055621 
  
Total 457.8878 135 
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Discussion 
As expected, mean grievance was not affected by any factors, though surprisingly 
the expected value of the mean is slightly less than 10.  The 95% confidence interval for 
the mean is (9.84, 9.98).  This slight shift away from high grievance is likely a result of 
arrests removing civilians with highly aggrieved opinions from the communication pool. 
The remaining responses each had significant curvature, both pure quadratic and 
interaction, including the effects of every factor except for D, the enabling of preferential 
movement toward friends.  There is, however, an observable qualitative effect as clusters 
of like-minded Civilians flow into and out of existence in a replication.  There may be an 
effect under MISO influence, but the qualitative effect (clustering) has no effect upon 
these quantitative responses without external influence.  Removing factor D from 
analysis projects the design to a 25 full factorial design with 4 replications and 8 center 
points.  Factor B, the movement range of civilians, was non-significant for all but mean 
prisoner ratio, and in that response it had a weak effect with no interactions.  In the 
original Epstein model, movement and vision range of civilians were a single value, so 
this finding supports his formulation. 
Pure quadratic curvature is modeled and found to be statistically significant, but 
no axial runs are made to better estimate the effect.  In such a generalized model, there is 
no reason to estimate these effects unless they appear to have a practical effect upon 
interpretation.  The effect of pure curvature in each response is small compared to the 
other factors modeled.   
By the nature of this experiment, which is exploratory, there is no one set of “best 
results,” but two outcomes seem interesting to explore: maximizing rebellion while 
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minimizing imprisonment, and minimizing rebellion while also minimizing variance of 
grievance.   
The former result represents the optimal conditions for successful rebellious 
activity.  Using a desirability function with equal weight given to each response, we find 
that this condition occurs when all vision and range variables are low, population density 
is low, and Cop density is low.  As seen in Figure 5, created using JMP 9.0.1, this results 
in mean rebel density of 0.2457 and mean prisoner density of 0.0065.  Interestingly, 
statistical prediction of rebellion in countries has led to the finding that the presence of 
mountainous terrain is predictive of rebellion (O'Brien, 2010).  This analysis suggests a 
set of possible underlying factors, as well as possible ways to counteract this seemingly 
unavoidable effect.  By increasing range of vision for civilians and cops, perhaps by 
encouraging the development of internet technology or mass transit, it may be possible to 
decrease rebel activity in such regions without moving mountains. 
 
Figure 5.  Prediction profile for rebel-optimal scenario 
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The latter result represents the optimal conditions for government: non-rebellious 
citizens who have a low prevalence of extremist opinions regarding the government.  
Using a desirability function with equal weight given to each response, we find that this 
condition occurs when Civilian vision is high, Cop vision is low, and Cop and population 
densities are high.  As seen in Figure 6, created again using JMP 9.0.1, this results in 
mean rebel ratio of 0.0027 and grievance variance of 5.013.  Low Cop vision is 
surprising; one might expect the ability to quickly imprison any rebels would be helpful 
in decreasing the presence of rebels, but that appears not to be the case.  High Civilian 
vision is more intuitive; this increases the probability of civilians observing Cops and 
therefore having their rebellious tendencies counteracted by the chance of being arrested.  
This suggests that a highly effective police force need only have a reputation of 
effectiveness, be visible, and exist in large numbers. 
 
Figure 6.  Prediction profile for government-optimal scenario 
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Future research should include analysis of changes in responses due to externally 
introduced factors, such as potential MISO plans in both the presence and absence of pro-
rebel tactics.  These can be introduced by defining and populating a new class of agent 
that exists outside of the original logic.  Much can also be added in the form of 
psychological realism.  Influence psychology suggests ways to increase the realism of 
friendships, as well as introduce new relationships that influence interactions.  For 
examples, see Cialdini (2007). 
Conclusion 
Use of a designed experiment on the results of an Agent-Based Model (ABM) 
shows that a simplified form of communication and influence between agents is sufficient 
to generate realistic patterns of rebellion and suggest underlying factors that influence 
empirically observed but unexplained phenomena.  This model represents both a proof of 
concept for a generative social science (GSS) approach to MISO effects analysis and a 
virtual test bed within which psychological experiments can be performed with complete 
control of external factors and no ethical restrictions.  Expansion of this technique may 
provide MISO operators with unbiased forecasting of effects to use in operations 
planning.  
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III. Forecasting Effects of MISO Actions: An ABM Methodology 
Introduction 
In the last decade, the United States has found herself fighting wars on a 
battlespace she has little expertise with: the hearts and minds of populations whose 
support can make or break a campaign. This sort of campaign relies heavily upon 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), operations whose purpose is “to 
induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of 
individuals, foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner advantageous to US 
forces and objectives” (Department of the Air Force, 2011, p. 2).  
MISO is a difficult task.  The effects are nearly impossible to measure due to 
confounding nuisance factors outside of the operators’ control, and experimentation is not 
ethically viable.  Therefore, forecasting of effects has traditionally relied upon subject 
matter experts armed with sophisticated intelligence products (Department of the Air 
Force, 2005).  This research develops an agent-based model (ABM) of civil rebellion in a 
generalized population and allows experimentation using MISO agents to compare 
effects of different strategies.  
This paper begins with a brief background on social simulation, with a focus on 
ABM, followed by an overview of the base simulation.  A hypothetical application 
scenario is then presented, with comparison of options that may be available to the MISO 
planner.  Results and analysis are discussed as well as a broad range of potential avenues 
for future research. 
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Background 
ABM of sociological phenomena is not new; one of the first ABMs examined 
racial segregation in housing (Schelling, 1971).  Advances in computer processing have 
enabled greater use of this technique in the last two decades.  Epstein and Axtell’s (1996) 
Sugarscape marked the beginning of a research paradigm termed Generative Social 
Science (GSS).  The key desideratum of GSS is the use of the simplest possible set of 
rules to explain an emergent behavior of interest (Epstein, 2006).   
GSS has gained popularity as a methodology, and examples of its application can 
be found in many of the social sciences including economics (Zhang, Li, Xiong, & 
Zhang, 2010; Roozmand, Ghasem-Aghaee, Hofstede, Nematbakhsh, Baraani, & 
Verwaart, 2011), archaeology (Epstein, 2006), and sociology (Gorman, Mezic, Mezic, & 
Gruenewald, 2006; Mäs, Flache, & Helbing, 2010).  In psychology, Epstein (2006) 
generated thoughtless application of norms in an ABM and Willer, Macy, and Kuwabara 
(2009) supported this with laboratory experiments showing support of norms that 
disagree with personal beliefs.  This demonstrates the potential for GSS and traditional 
experimentation to augment each other. 
Epstein’s (2006) civil violence model serves as the basis for our model.  As 
presented in detail in Chapter 2, we expand on Epstein’s work to add communication 
between civilians and movement that is more grounded in influence psychology, 
specifically the concept of liking as presented by Cialdini (2007).   
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Civil Rebellion Simulation 
In order to be generalizable across situations, this social environment cannot be 
modeled after any individual nation or culture.  Rather, fields are provided that can be 
manipulated to better reflect a given culture.  Values in those fields are set here to those 
used by Epstein (2006), those found to be of average response in Chapter 2, or those of 
observed global averages.  Where the deviation is not intentional, we adhere as closely as 
possible to Epstein’s model.  This serves as a form of verification and validation; we 
maintain every qualitative trait observed in his analysis. 
Note that the strength of this abstraction is an appropriate comparison between 
treatments, rather than actual forecasting of specific levels of rebellion or anti-
government sentiment.  To accomplish the latter, every variable that affects rebellions 
would have to be accounted for, which would make for a very complicated and over-
specified model. 
All programming is done using Repast Simphony 2.0 Beta (North, Howe, Collier, 
& Vos, 2007).  An image of the simulation is shown in Figure 7.  Two types of agents are 
interacting in the basic social landscape: Civilians and Cops.  MISO agents are later 
added for experimentation. 
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Figure 7.  Screenshot of Simulation Portraying Civilians (People) Colored According to Whether 
They Are Active Rebels (Red) or Not (Blue) Exhibiting Grievance (Background Scaled Black to Red), 
Friendships (Lines), and Cops (Gold Stars) 
 
Civilian Behavior 
Civilians are represented by people in the visualization, and their logic is shown 
in Figure 8.  The level of grievance felt toward the government is represented as 
opinionGene in the manner of a genetic algorithm as introduced by Holland (1995).  
Overall grievance is considered the mean value of 20 individual memes within the 
opinionGene, each represented by a binary digit, scaled down by the legitimacy of the 
government, which is static in this analysis at 0.82.  That is,  
 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = �
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For ease of presentation, we refer instead to grievance as  
 
𝐺𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒′ = �𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖
20
𝑖=1
 (5) 
 
 
Figure 8.  Civilian Logic Flow 
 
After a civilian moves to a randomly chosen empty block within its movement 
range, it examines its surroundings and decides whether it should become actively 
rebellious.  To do so, it counts both the number of cops (C) and the number of active 
rebels (A) in its vision range (civVision) and computes an estimated probability of arrest 
(P) (Epstein, 2006),  
 𝑃 = 1 − 𝑒−2.3�
𝐶
𝐴�𝑐𝑖𝑣𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (6) 
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It then calculates net risk (N) by multiplying this probability by its risk tolerance (R),  
 𝑁 = 𝑅𝑃 (7) 
If the difference between grievance and N exceeds a threshold (rebelThreshold), set here 
to 0.1, the Civilian will become an active rebel.  Otherwise, it will remain inactive. 
After choosing a state, a civilian will randomly choose a civilian from its Moore 
neighborhood, the eight bordering patches, with whom to communicate.  A random topic, 
or index of the opinion gene, is chosen to discuss, and if the two civilians’ opinions 
differ, the target civilian will change their opinion.  If the 1-norm distance between the 
civilians’ opinion genes is less than 25% of the possible difference, a friendship will be 
formed, and for the next 20 ticks the two civilians will prefer to move toward each other.  
There is also a 1% chance of a mutation, the alteration of a random opinion within the 
source’s opinion gene.  This prohibits opinions from going extinct over time. 
Cop Behavior 
Cops are far simpler than Civilians, as shown by their logic flow in Figure 9.  
Before moving, a Cop examines the blocks within its vision looking for active rebels.  If 
it sees any, it moves to one of their locations and arrests that rebel for a random period of 
time between 1 and 30 steps.  Arrested Civilians cannot be seen and remain static for the 
duration of their term.  If there are no rebels within the Cop’s vision, it will randomly 
move to an empty block within its vision. 
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Figure 9.  Cop Logic Flow 
 
MISO Agents 
MISO agents are those added into the base simulation as described above for the 
purpose of experimentation.  Here we have coded an agent whose behavior can be 
modified to act in many roles by modifying variable values.  These agents have limited 
effectiveness depending on their affiliation (government or rebel), government 
legitimacy, their media (written or internet), range of influence (commRange), the 
number of opinions about which they communicate (commBreadth), and the number of 
contacts that can be made in a turn (commAttempts). Two forms of this agent are used in 
this case study: a pamphlet distributor and an internet campaigner.  The values associated 
with each are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Variable values for two types of MISO agents 
Variable Pamphlet Distributor Internet Campaigner 
Affiliation Government/Rebel Government/Rebel 
Susceptible Population Literate Civilians Web-connected Civilians 
commRange 3 40 
commBreadth [1, 20] [1, 20] 
commAttempts 10 10 
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Every turn, this agent chooses a target list of size commAttempts within range 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 from those susceptible to its influence.  For each target on this list, one of 
the commBreadth topics to which they are assigned is chosen, and the target’s opinion on 
that topic is set, if rebel, to 1 with probability  (1 − 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)  , or if government, to 0 
with probability  (𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑦)  .  Agents with written messages may only affect literate 
Civilians, and agents with internet messages may only affect web-connected Civilians.  
Generally, internet range is also unlimited, which is modeled using  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 40  
rather than the pamphlet range of  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 3  . 
Application 
In this analysis, we pose a hypothetical scenario in which an area we are 
interested in is being affected by a rebel pamphlet-based propaganda campaign.  In this 
hypothetical case, the area of interest has been modeled in the past, and the values laid 
out in Table 6 seem to have produced appropriate responses, so they are assumed as 
ground truth.  Note that these values correspond to those used in center runs in Chapter 2.  
Literacy and internet connectivity rates for the global average are used and taken from the 
CIA World Factbook (2012), but country-specific values could be found in the same 
manner.  The rebel propaganda campaign is reported to have a moderate level of focus, 
equivalent to 25% of possible anti-government topics.  Thus, commBreadth is set to 5 for 
the rebel agent. 
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Table 6.  Values used in simulation for application scenario 
Variable Name Value 
civVision 4 
civRange 4 
copVision 4 
popDensity 0.5 
copDensity 0.04 
legitimacy 0.82 
literacy 0.84 
connectivity 0.30 
 
Due to budget and political constraints, only one counter-rebel campaign may be 
implemented.  Two possibilities are pamphlet campaigns and internet campaigns with 
pro-government information.  The determination of message focus is left to the MISO 
planner.  The goal is to minimize Civilians’ mean grievance. 
Note that the purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate how this tool could be 
used by a MISO campaigner.  There would almost certainly be changes to the grievance 
response if legitimacy, literacy, and connectivity were changed, but we assume for the 
purposes of this experiment that these factors are fixed.   
Information Medium 
To determine the optimal medium for information, we performed 20 replications, 
each of length 500 ticks, split equally between each of four conditions: no response, 
pamphlet campaign, internet campaign, and both campaigns.  All MISO agents for this 
analysis used commBreadth of 5, which is equivalent to the rebel pamphleteer.  While the 
use of both campaigns has been determined not to be a choice, it may be interesting for 
the decision-maker to see the effect that may have.  Averaging the mean grievance at 
each time step, we find the results in Figure 10.  There is no clearly optimal medium for 
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communicating the pro-government message.  If the goal has a short-term focus, the 
pamphlet campaign serves as the most effective response to the rebel message; if the 
focus is more long-term, the internet campaign serves as the most effective.  The 
cumulative effect of introducing both campaigns is certainly stronger than either 
campaign alone.  As shown in Figure 11, this translates to decreased rebellious activity, 
though the higher noise in this variable obscures the short-term difference between 
pamphlet and internet responses. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Civilian Grievance Response to Pro-Government Information Campagins 
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Figure 11.  Civilian Rebellion Response to Pro-Government Information Campaigns 
 
 
Topical Focus 
Because neither medium was ruled out in the first experiment, we performed 
another experiment for both pamphlet and internet campaigns.  We expected significant 
curvature in the effect of message breadth, so we performed 2 runs at each level of 
breadth (every integer in [1, 20]) for each medium, for a total of 80 replications.  The 
effect is not statistically significant early in a run.  At tick 100, where the difference 
between internet and pamphlet responses was greatest, there is no evidence of breadth 
affecting grievance.   
At tick 500, there is strong evidence (𝑝 < 0.0001) of a negative linear effect of 
breadth upon grievance.  There is insufficient evidence to show that this effect differs 
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between treatments.  Breadth and campaign type explain 44.4% of variance in grievance.  
The majority of observed variance, then, is attributable simply to noise, as nothing else is 
altered between runs.  The associated ANOVA is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7.  ANOVA for Breadth Effect on Grievance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio p-value 
Model 2 9.031941 4.51597 30.73 <.0001 
 Type 1 2.616809 2.616809 7.8067 <.0001 
 Breadth 1 6.415132 6.415132 43.6533 <.0001 
Error 77 11.31564 0.14696   
 Lack Of Fit 37 6.071054 0.164083 1.2514 0.2434 
 Pure Error 40 5.244583 0.131115   
Total 79 20.34758    
 
Recommendations 
Based on the analysis of our selected hypothetical scenario and parameter settings 
used, we would recommend to the decision-maker to use a broad-themed internet 
campaign for long-term effect on civilian support for the government.  For a short-term 
effect, breadth is inconsequential, but we would recommend a pamphlet campaign. 
Conclusion 
The intent of this paper is not to inform a decision-maker; instead, this 
demonstrates the flexibility of using an agent-based model to compare MISO actions in 
silica.  Real-world effects are more complicated and difficult or impossible to measure, 
so this technique offers insight into subtle effects that are otherwise hidden.  Furthermore, 
as we begin to better understand the effects of different variables, the number of runs, and 
therefore analyst time, required for proper analysis may decrease.  Case in point: the 
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curvature expected in the effect of message breadth was not found.  Far less data could 
have been collected to analyze the effect of breadth. 
Much future research can be considered.  As alluded to in the scenario, the results 
of this model currently possess only face validity.  It would be interesting to attempt 
validating for a certain area of interest.  Even altering only literacy and web-connectivity 
to match a particular region would be illuminating. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Research Summary 
This thesis develops an agent-based model (ABM) of a human social landscape as 
a technique for understanding the impact of structural factors and external factors on anti-
government rebellion.  The model is built in the spirit of generative social science, with a 
focus on rule simplicity and successful generation of realistic outcomes.  It adds to the 
base of published work by modeling opinion with a genetic algorithm, which allows for 
sustainable variation in beliefs, and by examining the addition of elements from influence 
psychology. 
In Chapter 2, a factorial experiment examined environmental effects and found 
that the addition of friendship behavior as modeled had no quantitative effect on Civilian 
opinion.  This suggests that it may be an extraneous agent rule for future work, and it 
supports the arguments for simplicity in generative social science.  Other environmental 
factors, such as range of vision and population density, had significant primary and 
interaction effects.  These results agree with real-world observations.  This type of 
analysis serves as a proof of concept for ABM in forecasting a region’s proclivity to 
rebel. 
In Chapter 3, a hypothetical application from the perspective of a MISO planner 
was presented, with results suggesting that while written propaganda in a limited area is 
effective for short-term moderation of opinions, internet-based propaganda may be more 
effective for a long-term effect.  Furthermore, the results suggest that a broader message 
is more effective than a narrowly focused message, though this effect only becomes 
noticeable over longer periods of time.  This analysis serves as a proof of concept for 
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application of ABM to comparing MISO plans to prevent, or possibly encourage, 
rebellions by moderating anti-government sentiment. 
Future Work 
Generative social science is a young methodology, and the base of published 
work implementing it remains small.  The subset of that work that is focused on MISO 
planning is sparse, so there is ample opportunity for further investigation into this field.  
This simulation itself could be improved upon, and its capabilities could be further 
examined and validated. 
While the addition of friendship behavior had no significant effect, there is a 
plethora of additional social psychology that could be applied to Civilian agent behavior.  
Much of this is explored in Chapter 1.  Only two of the six major concepts defining 
interpersonal persuasion as presented in Cialdini (2007) are implemented here.  Social 
proof is present when a Civilian is more likely to become actively rebellious when it can 
see others that are active, and liking is present in the application of friendship.  
Commitment and consistency could be implemented by increasing or decreasing the rebel 
threshold depending on present state; the agent would be less likely to change states. 
Reciprocation, authority, and scarcity could be added by modifying the social 
scenario.  For example, adding states of employment that lead to borrowing and lending 
behavior could introduce an avenue for reciprocation.  An agent may be more likely to 
become actively rebellious after accepting a loan from another rebel.  Changing the 
strength of reciprocity based on agent wealth would implement the scarcity principle.  
Also, by adding additional familial relationships, which would necessitate agent births 
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and deaths, social structure could be made more rigid.  This would allow the simulation 
of authority. 
Adding more social psychological principles into the model would also enable 
greater regional specification.  The model presented in this thesis is intentionally 
generalized, but a user may wish for a model to be specifiable to a region.  Each of the 
influence effects may be altered in strength depending on a culture’s GLOBE values, as 
discussed by House et al. (2004).  In this manner the effects of culture could be 
measured, and effects specific to a single culture could be examined with greater 
accuracy. 
In order to truly validate the results of this model, it would probably have to be 
specified to a region of interest.  One possible methodology for regional specification is 
the use of GLOBE values as discussed above, but another is to build a more descriptive 
response surface than that explored in Chapter 2.  With a response surface examining 
every major input in the model, sets of input variables could be identified that would 
generate responses, such as rebellion and prison rates, observed in a region.  Subject 
matter expert involvement would be necessary to identify which sets of inputs are 
realistic.  With this “backward-validated” simulation, forecasts of MISO effects would be 
more directly applicable and compared to real-world observations. 
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Appendix A.  Code for UserGlobalsAndPanelFactory.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import repast.simphony.relogo.factories.AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory 
4 
5 public class UserGlobalsAndPanelFactory extends AbstractReLogoGlobalsAndPanelFactory{ 
6  public void addGlobalsAndPanelComponents(){ 
7 
8  addReLogoTickCountDisplay() 
9 
10 //User Interface 
11  addButtonWL("setup","Setup") 
12   //Press to initialize a replication 
13  addButtonWL("go","Step") 
14   //Press to advance time one tick 
15  addToggleButtonWL("go","Go") 
16   //Press to advance time continually, press again to stop 
17 addToggleButtonWL("goDOE", "Go DOE-style") 
18   //Press to replicate the experiment from Chapter 2 
19  addToggleButtonWL("goMISOpt1", "Go MISO experiment, part 1") 
20   //Press to replicate experiment 1, Chapter 3 
21  addToggleButtonWL("goMISOpt2", "Go MISO experiment, part 2") 
22   //Press to replicate experiment 2, Chapter 3 
23  addSliderWL("civVision", "Civilian Vision", 0, 0.5, 10, 7) 
24  addSliderWL("civRange", "Civilian Move Range", 0, 0.5, 10, 4) 
25  addSliderWL("copVision", "Cop Vision and Range", 0, 0.5, 10, 7) 
26  addSliderWL("literacy", "Literacy", 0, 0.01, 1, 0.84) 
27 addSliderWL("connectivity", "Web Use", 0, 0.01, 1, 0.30) 
28  addSliderWL("numRebPamphlets", "Number of Rebel Pamphleters", 0, 1, 5, 0) 
29  addSliderWL("numGovPamphlets", "Number of Govvy Pamphleters", 0, 1, 5, 0) 
30  addSliderWL("numRebWebCampaigns", "Number of Rebel Web Campaigns", 0, 1, 5, 0) 
31  addSliderWL("numGovWebCampaigns", "Number of Govvy Web Campaigns", 0, 1, 5, 0) 
32  addSliderWL("rebBreadth", "Breadth of Rebel MISO Campaign", 1, 1, 20, 5) 
33  addSliderWL("govBreadth", "Breadth of Govvy MISO Campaign", 1, 1, 20, 5) 
34  addSwitchWL("unlimitedJailTerm", "Kill rather than Imprison") 
35   //Jailed Civilians are never released while checked 
36  addSwitchWL("disableComm", "Disable communication between agents") 
37   //Communication does not occur while checked 
38  addSwitchWL("disableMoveTowardFriends", "Do not move toward friends") 
39   //Friendships form but movement is random while checked 
40  addMonitorWL("totalRebs", "Active Rebels", 1) 
41   //Monitor to allow observation of rebel population 
42  addMonitorWL("prisoners", "Prisoners", 1) 
43   //Monitor to allow observation of jailed population 
44  addMonitorWL("meanGrievance", "Mean Grievance", 1) 
45   //Monitor for mean grievance of all Civilians 
46 
47  //Global variables 
48  addGlobal("legitimacy", 0.82) 
49   //Government legitimacy, from Epstein (2006) 
50  addGlobal("maxJailTerm", 30) 
51   //Jail terms drawn from uniform distribution between 1 and this value 
52  addGlobal("copDensity", 0.04) 
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53   //Proportion of popDensity to be designated as Cops 
54  addGlobal("popDensity", 0.70) 
55   //Proportion of all patches to be populated with Cops or Civilians 
56  addGlobal("rebelThreshold", 0.1) 
57   //Threshold for going active, taken from Epstein (2006) 
58  addGlobal("k", 2.3) 
59   //Arrest constant, from Epstein (2006) 
60  addGlobal("emptyPatches") 
61   //List of empty patches to be updated 
62  addGlobal("inactives") 
63   //List of inactive civilians 
64  addGlobal("actives") 
65   //List of active civilians 
66  addGlobal("prisoners") 
67   //List of jailed rebels 
68 addGlobal("literates") 
69   //List of literate civilians 
70  addGlobal("webUsers") 
71   //List of civilians connected to the internet 
72  addGlobal("friendThreshold", 0.25) 
73   //This is later multiplied by (1-legitimacy) 
74  addGlobal("friendLife", 20) 
75   //How long a friendship lasts without interaction 
76  addGlobal("maxTicks", 500) 
77   //Ticks per replication 
78  } 
79 }  
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Appendix B.  Code for UserObserver.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import com.sun.jndi.ldap.Filter; 
4 import com.sun.org.apache.xpath.internal.operations.Mod; 
5 
6 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
7 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseObserver; 
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
12 
13 class UserObserver extends BaseObserver{ 
14 
15  //methods for Panel Factory 
16  def relogoRun = 0 
17  def timestamp() {ticks()} 
18  def totalCops() {numCops} //number of Cops, does not change within 
replication 
19  def totalCivs() {numCivilians} //number of Civilians of all statuses, does not 
change within replication 
20  def totalRebs() {count(actives)} //number of active rebels in the model, 
changes with time 
21  def prisoners() {count(prisoners)} //number of jailed Civilians, changes with 
time 
22  def grievanceHistogram() { //Captures how many Civilians have each value of 
grievance 
23  def histogram = new ArrayList([0] * 21) 
24  for (i in 0..20) { 
25   histogram[i] = count(civilians().with({grievance == i / 20 * (1 - 
legitimacy)})) 
26   } 
27   histogram 
28  } 
29  def meanGrievance() { //Captures the mean grievance of all Civilians, changes 
with time 
30   def sumGrievance = 0 
31   foreach({sumGrievance += it.grievance * 20 / (1 - legitimacy)}, civilians()) 
32   sumGrievance / numCivilians 
33  } 
34 
35  //variables 
36  def totalSize //Total number of patches 
37  def numCivilians //Total number of Civilians 
38  def numCops //Total number of Cops 
39 
40  //methods 
41  def setup() { //Run to initialize a replication 
42 
43   relogoRun++ 
44   clearAll() 
45 
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46   //Variable Setup 
47   totalSize = (maxPxcor - minPxcor + 1) * (maxPycor - minPycor + 1) 
48   numCivilians = round(popDensity * (1 - copDensity) * totalSize) 
49   numCops = round(copDensity * popDensity * totalSize) 
50   emptyPatches = new LinkedList(patches().toList()) //All patches are empty 
51   assert count(emptyPatches) == totalSize //Verification assertion 
52  friendThreshold = friendThreshold * (1-legitimacy) //Scale friend threshold to  
same scale as grievance 
53 
54   populateAgents() //Initially create Civilians and Cops 
55 
56   setUpLists() //Initialize inactive, active, prisoner, literate, and 
web-connected lists 
57 
58  implementMISO() //Place MISO agents - change this method to change values 
59 
60   initializeAgents() //Set Civilian and Cop attributes, place them and MISO, 
initial rebel decisions 
61 
62   checkAssertions() //Verification assertions 
63  } 
64 
65  def go() { //Running once corresponds to a tick 
66   tick() 
67   ask(turtles()) { //Random order step for all Civilians, Cops, and MISO Agents 
68    step() 
69   } 
70   ask(patches()) { //Update background color 
71    checkColor() 
72   } 
73   ask(relationships()) { //If a relationship reaches max age, it dies 
74    step() 
75   } 
76   checkAssertions() //Verification assertions 
77  } 
78 
79  def goDOE() { 
80   //Note: this method replicates the experiment from Chapter 2. Random order is 
unnecessary but still completed. 
81   if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) { 
82    civVision = 7 
83    civRange = 7 
84    copVision = 7 
85    disableMoveTowardFriends = true 
86    popDensity = 0.7 
87    copDensity = 0.07 
88    setup() 
89    maxTicks = 300 
90   } else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) { 
91    assert relogoRun < 136 
92 
93    if([2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,8, 9, 12, 16, 17, 27, 28, 30, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43,  
47, 49, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 68, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79,  
 
57 
80, 83, 90, 93, 94, 95, 98, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 113, 114, 
115, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
94     civVision = 1 
95    } else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
96     civVision = 4 
97    } else { 
98     civVision = 7 
99    } 
100 
101    if([2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 28, 30, 33, 36, 38, 42,  
45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 64, 67, 70, 72, 73, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 
84, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 
108, 112, 115, 1 16, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 132, 
134].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
102     civRange = 1 
103    } else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
104     civRange = 4 
105    } else { 
106     civRange = 7 
107    } 
108 
109    if([2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 21, 25, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39,  
40, 45, 46, 47, 50, 54, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 
79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 98, 101, 108, 109, 110, 
112, 113, 115, 118, 122, 123, 128, 130, 134, 135, 
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
110     copVision = 1 
111    } else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
112     copVision = 4 
113    } else { 
114     copVision = 7 
115    } 
116 
117    if([1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31,  
35, 39, 43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53, 58, 61, 64, 65, 67, 68, 71, 72, 
73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 100, 
102, 106, 107, 109, 116, 117, 120, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 
135, 136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
118     disableMoveTowardFriends = true 
119    } else { 
120     disableMoveTowardFriends = false 
121    } 
122 
123    if([2, 5, 10, 12, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44, 46,  
47, 49, 51, 55, 57, 58, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 78, 86, 
88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 107, 108, 
109, 112, 113, 118, 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 
135].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
124     popDensity = 0.3 
125    } else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
126     popDensity = 0.5 
127    } else { 
128     popDensity = 0.7 
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129    } 
130 
131    if([4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 43, 44, 45,  
47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 77, 
78, 80, 82, 83, 89, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 111, 
113, 117, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 
136].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
132     copDensity = 0.01 
133    } else if ([14,23,52,61,76,81,121,131].contains(relogoRun + 1)) { 
134     copDensity = 0.04 
135    } else { 
136     copDensity = 0.07 
137    } 
138 
139    setup() 
140 
141  } else { 
142    go() 
143   } 
144  } 
145 
146 
147  def goMISOpt1() { 
148   //Note: This method replicates the experiment for message medium, Chapter 3 
149   if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) { 
150    civVision = 4 
151    civRange = 4 
152    copVision = 4 
153    disableMoveTowardFriends = false 
154    popDensity = 0.5 
155    copDensity = 0.04 
156    numRebPamphlets = 1 
157    numGovPamphlets = 0 
158    numRebWebCampaigns = 0 
159    numGovWebCampaigns = 0 
160    rebBreadth = 5 
161    govBreadth = 5 
162    maxTicks = 500 
163    setup() 
164   } else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) { 
165 
166    if (relogoRun == 5) { 
167     numGovPamphlets = 1 
168    } else if (relogoRun == 10) { 
169     numGovPamphlets = 0 
170     numGovWebCampaigns = 1 
171    } else if (relogoRun == 15) { 
172     numGovPamphlets = 1 
173    } else if (relogoRun == 20) { 
174     throw new IllegalArgumentException("MISO part 1 run  
complete.") 
175    } 
176 
177    setup() 
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178 
179   } else { 
180    go() 
181   } 
182  } 
183 
184  def goMISOpt2() { 
185   //Note: this method replicates the experiment for breadth, Chapter 3 
186   if(timestamp() == 0 && relogoRun == 0) { 
187    civVision = 4 
188    civRange = 4 
189    copVision = 4 
190    disableMoveTowardFriends = false 
191    popDensity = 0.5 
192    copDensity = 0.04 
193    numRebPamphlets = 1 
194    numGovPamphlets = 1 
195    numRebWebCampaigns = 0 
196    numGovWebCampaigns = 0 
197    rebBreadth = 5 
198    govBreadth = 1 
199    setup() 
200   } else if(timestamp() == maxTicks) { 
201 
202    if (mod(relogoRun,2) == 0 & relogoRun != 40 & relogoRun < 80) { 
203     govBreadth ++ 
204    } else if (relogoRun == 40) { 
205     numGovPamphlets = 0 
206     numGovWebCampaigns = 1 
207     govBreadth = 1 
208    } 
209 
210    setup() 
211 
212   } else { 
213    go() 
214   } 
215  } 
216 
217  def populateAgents() { //Part of initialization, create all Civs with uniform 
opinion and Cops 
218 
219   setDefaultShape(Civilian, "person") 
220   setDefaultShape(Cop, "star") 
221 
222   createCivilians(numCivilians) { 
223    riskAversion = randomFloat(1) 
224 
225    opinionGene = new ArrayList([0] * 20) 
226    int zeroPoints = random(21) // number of chromosomes to leave 0 
227 
228    def posElements = new LinkedList(0..19) 
229    while (zeroPoints > 0) { 
230     posElements -= oneOf(posElements) 
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231    zeroPoints -- 
232    } 
233    for (i in posElements) { 
234     opinionGene[i] = 1 
235    } 
236 
237    grievance = opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy) 
238   } 
239 
240   createCops(numCops) { 
241    setColor(yellow()) 
242   } 
243  } 
244 
245  def setUpLists() { //Part of initialization, setting up all lists 
246   inactives = new LinkedList(civilians().toList()) //none are active yet 
247   actives = new LinkedList() //none are active yet 
248   prisoners = new LinkedList() //none are jailed yet 
249 
250   def numLiterates = round(literacy * numCivilians) //set literate group 
251   literates = new ArrayList() 
252   def tempLiterates = nOf(numLiterates, civilians()) //for use here and with 
web users 
253   literates = tempLiterates.toList() 
254 
255   def numWebUsers = round(connectivity * numCivilians) 
256   webUsers = new ArrayList() 
257   webUsers = nOf(numWebUsers, tempLiterates).toList() //assume illiterate 
cannot use web 
258  } 
259 
260  def initializeAgents() { //Place all Civs, Cops, MISOs; check for rebels and 
set colors 
261   ask(turtles()) { 
262    targetPatch = oneOf(emptyPatches) 
263    emptyPatches -= targetPatch 
264    moveTo(targetPatch) 
265    assert targetPatch == patchHere() 
266   } 
267 
268   ask(civilians()) { 
269    checkActive() 
270    checkColor() 
271    jailed = false 
272   } 
273 
274   ask(patches()) { 
275    checkColor() 
276   } 
277  } 
278 
279  def implementMISO() { //Adding various MISO agents, global values set in Panel 
280   //add a rebel pamphlet distributor 
281   createMISOs(numRebPamphlets) { // change this number to alter number of 
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such agents 
282    //changeable values 
283    commBreadth = rebBreadth 
284    commRange = 3 
285    commAttempts = 10 
286    susceptibles = literates 
287    rebel = true // set to false for government, true for rebel 
288    setShape("frowny") 
289    setColor(white()) 
290   } 
291 
292   //add a government pamphleter 
293   createMISOs(numGovPamphlets) { // change this number to alter number of 
such agents 
294    //changeable values 
295    commBreadth = govBreadth 
296    commRange = 3 
297    commAttempts = 10 
298    susceptibles = literates 
299    rebel = false // set to false for government, true for rebel 
300    setShape("smiley") 
301    setColor(white()) 
302   } 
303 
304   //add a rebel internet campaign 
305   createMISOs(numRebWebCampaigns) { // change this number to alter  
number of such agents 
306    //changeable values 
307    commBreadth = rebBreadth 
308    commRange = 40 
309    commAttempts = 10 
310    susceptibles = webUsers 
311    rebel = true // set to false for government, true for rebel 
312    setShape("house") 
313    setColor(orange()) 
314   } 
315 
316   //add a government internet campaign 
317   createMISOs(numGovWebCampaigns) { // change this number to alter number  
of such agents 
318    //changeable values 
319    commBreadth = govBreadth 
320    commRange = 40 
321    commAttempts = 10 
322    susceptibles = webUsers 
323    rebel = false // set to false for government, true for rebel 
324    setShape("house") 
325    setColor(white()) 
326   } 
327 
328   //initialization of MISO Agents 
329   ask(MISOs()) { 
330    def tempBreadth = commBreadth 
331    commTopics = new LinkedList(1..20) 
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332    while (tempBreadth < 20) { 
333     commTopics -= oneOf(commTopics) 
334     tempBreadth ++ 
335    } 
336   } 
337  } 
338 
339  def checkAssertions() { //Verification 
340   assert count(actives) == count(civilians().with({active & !jailed})) 
341   assert count(prisoners) == count(civilians().with({jailed})) 
342   assert totalSize == count(emptyPatches) + count(actives) + count(inactives) + 
numCops + count(MISOs()) 
343  } 
344 
345 
346 } 
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Appendix C.  Code for Civilian.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import org.opengis.util.UnlimitedInteger; 
4 
5 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
6 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch; 
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle; 
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
12 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
13 
14 class Civilian extends BaseTurtle { 
15 
16  // Attributes used in checkActive 
17  def opinionGene //Array of size 20, used in manner of genetic algorithm 
18  def grievance //Mean value of opinionGene elements multiplied by (1 - legitimacy) 
19  def riskAversion //Drawn from Uniform(0,1) 
20  def C //Cops in vision 
21  def A //Active rebels in vision 
22  def probArrest //Subjective estimate of arrest probability - P in write-up 
23  def activePrior //True if active rebel last tick 
24  def active //True if active rebel 
25  def jailed //True if rebel jailed 
26  def netRisk //probArrest x risk aversion (N = RP in write-up) 
27 
28  // Attributes used to track jail timing 
29  def jailTerm //assigned by Cop at arrest 
30  def timeInJail //incremented every turn while jailed, then reset at release 
31 
32  // Attributes used in discrete space movement 
33  def sourcePatch //where Civ starts tick 
34  def availablePatches //patches within range that are empty 
35  def targetPatch //where Civ moves 
36 
37  def step() { //called once every tick 
38   if(jailed) { 
39    timeInJail++ 
40    if(timeInJail >= jailTerm & !unlimitedJailTerm) { 
41     releaseFromJail() 
42    } 
43   } else { 
44    move() 
45    checkActive() 
46    checkComm() 
47   } 
48   assert grievance >= 0 //Verification 
49   assert grievance <= 1 //Verification 
50  } 
51 
52  def move() { 
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53  assert jailed == false //Will throw error if jailed, jailed Civs cannot move 
54 
55  sourcePatch = patchHere() 
56  availablePatches = inRadius(emptyPatches,civRange) 
57  if(!emptyQ(availablePatches)) { 
58   //First try to move near a friend 
59    def localCivs = inRadius(inactives,civVision) +  
inRadius(actives,civVision) 
60    def localFriends 
61    def me = self() 
62    if(count(localCivs) > 0 & !disableMoveTowardFriends) { 
63     localFriends = localCivs.with { 
64      if(!relationshipNeighborQ(me)) { 
65       false //no relationship, so can't be friends 
66      } else { 
67       relationshipWith(me).friend //checks if  
relationship type is friend, to enable 
other types 
68      } 
69     } 
70     if(count(localFriends) > 0) { 
71      def friendToMoveTo = oneOf(localFriends) // pick a  
friend to move toward 
72      targetPatch = minOneOf(availablePatches) { // pick the  
patch closest to the friend 
73       distance(friendToMoveTo) 
74      } 
75     } else { 
76      // no nearby friends, move to random patch 
77      targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches) 
78     } 
79    } else { 
80     // there are no local civilians, or friend movement is turned off 
81     targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches) 
82    } 
83    emptyPatches -= targetPatch 
84    moveTo(targetPatch) 
85    assert targetPatch == patchHere() //Verification 
86    emptyPatches += sourcePatch 
87   } 
88  } 
89 
90  def checkActive() { 
91   C = count(inRadius(cops(),civVision)) 
92   A = count(inRadius(actives,civVision)) 
93   if(!active) {A++} // Compare as if Civ had already gone active 
94   probArrest = 1 - (e()**(-k*(C/A))) 
95   netRisk = riskAversion * probArrest // * maxJailTerm**alpha if jail terms deter  
rebellion - see Epstein (2006) 
96   checkColor() // Update Civ color 
97  } 
98 
99  def checkColor() { 
100   if(grievance - netRisk > rebelThreshold) { 
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101    active = true 
102    setColor(red()) 
103    if(!activePrior) { 
104     actives += self() 
105     inactives -= self() 
106     activePrior = true 
107    } 
108   } else { 
109    active = false 
110    setColor(blue()) 
111    if(activePrior) { 
112     actives -= self() 
113     inactives += self() 
114     activePrior = false 
115   } 
116   } 
117  } 
118 
119  def checkComm() { 
120   def localCivs = civiliansOn(neighbors()).with({!jailed}) 
121   if(count(localCivs) > 0) { //if no neighbors, no communication 
122    communicate(oneOf(localCivs)) 
123   } 
124  } 
125 
126  def communicate(target) { 
127 
128   def dGrievance = 0 
129   for (i in 0..19) { 
130    if (target.opinionGene[i] != opinionGene[i]) { 
131     dGrievance ++ 
132    } 
133   } 
134   dGrievance = dGrievance / 20 * (1 - legitimacy) 
135   checkLinks(target, dGrievance) 
136 
137   if(!disableComm) { 
138    def targetMeme = random(20) 
139    target.opinionGene[targetMeme] = opinionGene[targetMeme] 
140    target.grievance = target.opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy) 
141 
142    //introduce 1% probability of random mutation 
143    if(randomFloat(1) < 0.01) { 
144     def locus = random(19) 
145     opinionGene[locus] = 1 - opinionGene[locus] 
146    } 
147   } 
148 } 
149 
150  def checkLinks(target, dGrievance) { //if in friendship threshold, create or maintain  
friendship 
151   if(abs(dGrievance) <= friendThreshold) { 
152    if(!relationshipNeighborQ(target)) { 
153     createRelationshipWith(target) { 
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154      friend = true 
155      age = 0 
156     } 
157    } else { 
158     def commLink = relationshipWith(target) 
159     commLink.age = 0 
160    } 
161   } 
162  } 
163 
164  def releaseFromJail() { 
165   // Jail term is up, so release them! 
166   targetPatch = oneOf(emptyPatches) 
167   moveTo(targetPatch) 
168   emptyPatches -= targetPatch 
169   showTurtle() 
170   jailed = false 
171   prisoners -= self() 
172   actives += self() 
173   checkActive() 
174  } 
175 } 
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Appendix D.  Code for Cop.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch; 
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle; 
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
11 
12 class Cop extends BaseTurtle { 
13 
14  // Attributes used in discrete space movement 
15  def sourcePatch 
16  def availablePatches 
17  def targetPatch 
18  def arrestedToday 
19  def arrestedPatch 
20 
21  // Attributes used in checkArrest 
22  def nearbyRebels 
23 
24  def step() { 
25   checkArrest() //look for someone to arrest 
26   move() //move to arrest location or randomly in range 
27  } 
28 
29  def move() { 
30 
31   sourcePatch = patchHere() 
32 
33   if(arrestedToday) { // Cop moved to the arrest location 
34    targetPatch = arrestedPatch 
35    emptyPatches -= targetPatch 
36    moveTo(targetPatch) 
37    assert targetPatch == patchHere() 
38    emptyPatches += sourcePatch 
39   } else { // No arrest, so move randomly 
40    availablePatches = inRadius(emptyPatches,copVision) 
41    if(!emptyQ(availablePatches)) { 
42     targetPatch = oneOf(availablePatches) 
43     emptyPatches -= targetPatch 
44     moveTo(targetPatch) 
45     assert targetPatch == patchHere() 
46     emptyPatches += sourcePatch 
47    } 
48   } 
49   arrestedToday = false // Reset value for next turn 
50  } 
51 
52  def checkArrest() { 
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53   nearbyRebels = inRadius(actives,copVision) 
54   if(!emptyQ(nearbyRebels)) { 
55    // Cop sees a rebel. Book him Dano! 
56    def arrestee = oneOf(nearbyRebels) 
57    arrestedToday = true 
58    arrestedPatch = arrestee.patchHere() 
59    // Cop is going to move to the location of the poor sap. 
60    ask(arrestee) { 
61     jailed = true 
62     jailTerm = random(maxJailTerm) 
63     timeInJail = 0 
64     emptyPatches += patchHere() 
65     actives -= self() 
66     prisoners += self() 
67     hideTurtle() 
68    } 
69   } 
70  } 
71 } 
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Appendix E.  Code for MISO.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BasePatch; 
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseTurtle; 
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
11 
12 class MISO extends BaseTurtle { 
13 
14  //local variables 
15 def commBreadth // How many of the 20 opinions does the agent focus on? 
16  def commRange // How far away is communication effective? 
17  def commAttempts // With how many civilians can agent interact in one turn? 
18  def commTopics // Specific opinions this agent focuses upon 
19  def susceptibles // Set to either literates or webUsers, depending on type 
20  def rebel // Set to true if rebel, false if pro-government 
21  def targetPatch // Needed for initial location 
22 
23  def step() { 
24   def targetList = defineTargets() 
25   //println(self().toString() + targetList) //Provides output to console for verification 
26   communicate(targetList) 
27  } 
28 
29  def defineTargets() { 
30   def targetList = new LinkedList() 
31   targetList += inRadius(susceptibles, commRange).with{!jailed} 
32   def removals = count(targetList) - commAttempts 
33   while (removals > 0) { 
34    targetList -= oneOf(targetList) 
35    removals -- 
36   } 
37   targetList 
38  } 
39 
40  def communicate(targets) { 
41   def comm = { //set closure for use in a foreach() command (below) 
42    //Note: commented-out println() commands were used for verification and  
may be useful. They output to console. 
43    def topic = oneOf(commTopics) 
44    if(rebel) { 
45     if(randomFloat(1) < (1 - legitimacy)) { 
46      if(it.opinionGene[topic] == 1) { 
47       //println("Rebel " + self().toString() + " told " +  
it.toString() + " about topic " + 
topic.toString() + " and preached to the 
choir.") 
48      } else { 
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49       it.opinionGene[topic] = 1 
50       //println("Rebel " + self().toString() + " told " + 
it.toString() + " about topic " + 
topic.toString() + " and was successful.") 
51      } 
52     } 
53    } else { 
54     if(randomFloat(1) < legitimacy) { 
55      if(it.opinionGene[topic] == 0 ){ 
56       //println("Govvy " + self().toString() + " told " + 
it.toString() + " about topic " + 
topic.toString() + " and preached to the 
choir.") 
57      } else { 
58       it.opinionGene[topic] = 0 
59       //println("Govvy " + self().toString() + " told " + 
it.toString() + " about topic " + 
topic.toString() + " and was successful.") 
60      } 
61     } 
62    } 
63    it.grievance = it.opinionGene.sum() / 20 * (1 - legitimacy) //update target 
grievance 
64   } 
65 
66   foreach(comm, targets) //communicate with each target 
67  } 
68 } 
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Appendix F.  Code for Relationship.groovy 
1 package civilviolence.relogo 
2 
3 import static repast.simphony.relogo.Utility.*; 
4 import static repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG.*; 
5 import repast.simphony.relogo.BaseLink; 
6 import repast.simphony.relogo.Directed; 
7 import repast.simphony.relogo.Plural; 
8 import repast.simphony.relogo.Stop; 
9 import repast.simphony.relogo.Undirected; 
10 import repast.simphony.relogo.Utility; 
11 import repast.simphony.relogo.UtilityG; 
12 
13 @Undirected 
14 class Relationship extends BaseLink { 
15  def friend 
16  def age 
17 
18  def step() { 
19   age++ 
20   if (age >= friendLife) { 
21    die() 
22   } 
23   checkColor() 
24  } 
25 
26  def checkColor() { 
27   if(friend) { 
28    setColor(blue()) 
29   } 
30  } 
31 } 
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Appendix G.  Summary Chart 
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